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Abstract. In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle 
(KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, one knows 
that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of 
approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and 
additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them is a reflective form of the margin 
for error principle defended by Williamson in his account of knowledge. We argue that Williamson’s reductio 
rests on the inappropriate identification of distinct forms of knowledge. More specifically, an important 
distinction between perceptual knowledge and non-perceptual knowledge is wanting in his statement and 
analysis of the puzzle. We present an alternative account of this puzzle, based on a modular conception of 
knowledge: the (KK) principle and the margin for error principle can coexist, provided their domain of 
application is referred to the right sort of knowledge.  
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In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson formulates an argument against the 
principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one 
knows something, then one knows that one knows it” (Williamson 2000: 115). Principle 
(KK), which corresponds to axiom schema 4 of propositional modal logic, is also called 
“positive introspection” and was originally defended by Hintikka in his seminal work on 
epistemic logic (Hintikka 1962: c. 5, “Knowing that one knows”). Williamson’s argument 
proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows 
that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic 
principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them is a reflective form of the margin 
for error principle defended by Williamson in his account of knowledge. We argue that 
Williamson’s reductio rests on the inappropriate identification of distinct forms of knowledge. 
More specifically, an important distinction between perceptual knowledge and non-perceptual 
knowledge is wanting in his statement and analysis of the puzzle. The (KK) principle and the 
margin for error principle can coexist, provided their domain of application is referred to the 
right sort of knowledge. 
 
1. Margin for error 
 
Williamson’s argument against positive introspection rests on three other epistemic 
principles: a margin for error principle, knowledge of the margin for error principle, and a 
principle of closure. As we will see shortly, only the last two principles are actually needed 
for Williamson’s reductio, but since knowledge of the margin for error principle is parasitic 
on the margin for error principle itself, it is relevant to make the distinction. The margin for 
error principle is undoubtedly the main originality in Williamson’s theory of knowledge and 
the principle calls for a preliminary explanation before we state his argument.i The margin for 
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error principle is intended to express a reliability condition for knowledge. As Williamson 
puts it (2000: 17): 
 
Where one has only a limited capacity to discriminate between cases in which p is true and 
cases in which p is false, knowledge requires a margin for error: cases in which one is in a 
position to know p must not be too close to cases in which p is false, otherwise one’s beliefs 
in p in the former cases would lack a sufficiently reliable basis to constitute knowledge. 
 
Formally, the margin for error principle can be seen as a generalization of the principle of 
factivity of knowledge to the notion of approximate knowledge. To take a specific example: 
the factivity principle says that to know that someone with i hairs is bald implies that someone 
with i hairs is indeed bald. Assuming a fixed margin of 1 hair, the margin for error principle 
says that to know that someone with i hairs is bald implies that someone with i+1 hairs and 
someone with i-1 hairs are also bald (for i > 0). In other words, it is impossible to know that 
someone with i hairs is bald, while someone with i+1 hairs is not bald, because knowledge is 
necessarily approximate in such a case. Knowledge, according to Williamson, is not merely 
factive, we may say that it is factive with respect to neighbouring cases. In this situation, the 
principle takes the following form (where bald(i) means that someone with i hairs on their 
head is bald): 
 
(a) K(bald(i)) → (bald(i-1) & bald (i) & bald(i+1)) 
  
In section 5.1 of Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson states a particular form of the 
principle for the evaluation of the height of a tree. The logical form of the principle is 
different there. Suppose a certain tree is i inches tall. For every natural number i, let pi 
represent the statement that the tree is i inches tall. In this situation, we cannot have: 
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(b) Kpi → (pi-1 & pi & pi+1) 
 
because it would mean: to know that the tree is i inches tall, the tree has to be i-1 inches tall 
and i and i+1 inches tall, a plain contradiction. So, the margin for error principle takes a 
negative form: “for no natural number i is the tree i+1 inches tall while [Mr Magoo] knows 
that it is not i inches tall” (Williamson 2000: 115). Hence, the following schema is assumed 
for all i: 
 
(c) ¬(pi+1 & K¬pi) 
 
which is equivalent to: 
 
(d) K¬pi → ¬pi+1 
 
The situation being symmetric with respect to i-1, we get as a counterpart to (a): 
 
(e) K¬pi → (¬pi-1 & ¬pi & ¬pi+1) 
 
that is, Mr Magoo knows that the tree is not i inches tall only if the tree is not i-1 or i or i+1 
inches tall.  More generally, when the margin is n, the general version of (a) becomes: for all k 
such that |i-k| ≤ n, K(bald(i)) → bald(k), and likewise instead of (e) we will have that for 
every k such that |i-k| ≤ n, K¬pi → ¬pk.  
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Margin for error principles play a crucial role in Williamson’s version of the epistemic theory 
of vagueness, since they give an explanation of why one may not be able to judge whether 
someone is bald or not: for instance, suppose the cut-off for baldness is 4000 hairs. If one’s 
margin for error is 1000 hairs, it follows that one will not be able to know that someone with 
3500 hairs on their head is bald, or that someone with 4700 hairs on their head is not bald. 
Likewise, when a character like Mr Magoo makes judgements about the height of a tree, his 
judgements involve a margin for error: for Magoo to be sure that the tree is less than a certain 
height, a sufficient margin for error is needed, below which his judgements start to lose their 
reliability. Although one may not necessarily want to follow Williamson in his epistemic 
account of vagueness, we think that his use of the margin for error principle is fairly plausible 
in the kind of scenario that he discusses in order to refute the (KK) principle, namely 
situations in which one is to give explicit estimates about a certain quantity, based on one’s 
qualitative perception. Since Williamson’s rebuttal of (KK) hangs on accepting the margin for 
error principle, this will explain our attempt to preserve both principles. 
 
2. Williamson’s puzzle 
 
Williamson’s puzzle may be described as an epistemic sorites: Mr Magoo observes a certain 
tree and makes judgements about its height; from the assumption that Magoo’s knowledge is 
positively introspective, and that Magoo knows that his knowledge involves a margin for 
error, we end up with the counterintuitive conclusion that Magoo’s knowledge can be 
extended indefinitely. The puzzle can be formalized using a propositional modal language. 
The usual rules of modus ponens and substitution are assumed, and the following axioms and 
rule are taken to hold for every proposition φ and natural number i: 
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(KME) K(K¬pi → ¬pi+1) 
 
(KK) Kφ → KKφ 
 
(C) If φ follows logically from a set of propositions Г, such that for all members ψ of Г, Kψ 
holds, infer Kφ  
 
Define (ME) to be the schematic version of the margin for error principle presented as (d) 
above (namely the upward part of the schema, for a margin of 1 unit). (KME) states Mr 
Magoo’s knowledge of (ME), namely the fact that “Mr Magoo reflects on the limitations of 
his eyesight and ability to judge heights” (Williamson 2000: 115). It is therefore a principle of 
reflection on the margin for error principle. Principle (C) is a principle of closure of 
knowledge under logical consequence. To avoid too much idealization, Williamson assumes 
in his presentation that both principles (C) and (KK) are restricted to propositions pertinent to 
the argument. This restriction will be left implicit here. 
 
The assumption made by Williamson is that Mr Magoo knows that the tree is not i inches 
tall for a certain number i. We thus have the following derivation: 
 
(1) K¬pi, hypothesis 
(2) K(K¬pi → ¬pi+1), by (KME) 
(3) KK¬pi, by (1) and (KK) 
(4) K¬pi, K¬pi → ¬pi+1 ├ ¬pi+1, by propositional reasoning 
(5) K¬pi+1, by (2), (3), (4) and (C) 
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The derivation yields as a derived rule that, from K¬pi, one can infer K¬pi+1. This 
consequence is puzzling and undesirable because if, for instance, Mr Magoo knows that 
K¬p0, then we can infer K¬pn, for any n, by n applications of the derived rule and modus 
ponens. Thus, supposing Mr Magoo knows that the tree he sees is not 0 inches tall, he knows 
that it is not k inches tall for a particular k. But if the tree happens to be precisely k inches tall, 
then Mr Magoo knows something false! In other words, we get a formal contradiction if, 
besides principles (KME), (KK) and (C), we explicitly assume factivity of knowledge, K¬p0, 
and pk for some k. 
 
How did the puzzle arise? Williamson considers that principle (KME) is well motivated for 
all i, and that principle (C), seen as a restricted closure principle, is legitimate too, assuming 
that Magoo makes careful deductions on the basis of what he knows. As a consequence, he 
takes (KK) to be the culprit. Several other options can be entertained, we should note: to 
abandon factivity, to reject the premise that the tree has a definite size k, or to deny that Mr 
Magoo knows the tree is not of size 0. The first two options are clearly off the mark, and the 
assumption that, for a given tree, the agent knows that it is not of null size seems perfectly 
harmless: if Mr Magoo can recognize the tree as a tree, then obviously he has to ascribe a 
positive size to it. Our claim, therefore, is that Williamson goes too quickly over the 
examination of principles (KK), (KME), (C) and their interaction. We still think that the 
principle of margin for error makes sense, but there is a specificity of the reflection condition 
embodied in (KME) that is not taken into account in Williamson’s interpretation. 
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3. Reflective knowledge and perceptual knowledge 
 
In our view, Williamson, in his statement of (KME), fails to take into account the fact that 
different sorts of knowledge are involved. The same criticism applies to the other principles. 
We shall argue that the idea that the same sort of knowledge is involved at each level is 
psychologically implausible. Besides, distinguishing between forms of knowledge can help us 
to avoid the puzzle without necessarily discarding the motivations underlying the margin for 
error principle. 
 
In order to see this, let us have a closer look at (KME). By (C), (KME) is equivalent to the 
schema:  
 
K(pi+1 → ¬K¬pi) 
 
that is, Mr Magoo knows that if the tree is i+1 inches tall, then he does not know that it is not 
i inches tall. The question we want to raise concerns the reading of the operator K in this 
sentence. The non-iterative principle (ME), namely (pi+1 → ¬K¬pi), states a constraint 
concerning Mr Magoo’s perceptual knowledge: if the tree is i+1 inches tall, then Magoo 
cannot rule out, simply on the basis of his perception, that it is i inches tall. As Williamson 
emphasizes, the actual length of the measurement unit does not matter, since one could make 
the case “even stronger by reducing the interval of an inch to something much smaller” (2000: 
115). What (ME) says is that I am not necessarily able to discriminate perceptually between 
two adjacent sizes, when the interval is sufficiently small. To make explicit the fact that the 
knowledge involved in (ME) is perceptual, one may therefore write the principle more 
explicitly as: (pi+1 →¬Kπ ¬pi), where Kπ denotes perceptual knowledge. 
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In the case of (KME), by contrast, it is doubtful that the outermost knowledge operator 
should have the same meaning as the embedded one. Let us suppose, for the sake of the 
argument, that it is the case, and that K(pi+1 → ¬K¬pi) is to be read uniformly as : 
 
Kπ (pi+1 → ¬Kπ ¬pi) 
 
Then it would mean that I know by perception a certain conditional fact about my perceptual 
knowledge. This is certainly a very controversial claim. Can I really perceive a conditional 
fact of this kind, in the same sense in which I perceive the height of a tree? Assume, on the 
other hand, that the knowledge involved in (KME) is some form of non-perceptual 
knowledge, for which one may introduce a distinct operator Kρ. In that case, the explicit form 
of the principle becomes: 
 
Kρ (pi+1 → ¬Kρ ¬pi) 
 
In this case, however, the margin for error principle: pi+1 → ¬Kρ ¬pi, does not necessarily 
hold. Suppose Kρ is a form of logical knowledge. In the case where i=0, principle (ME) would 
mean: if a quantity is strictly positive, I do not know logically that it is non-zero. Why should 
it be the case? A fortiori, why should (KME) hold, that is why should I know logically that if 
a quantity is strictly positive, I do not know logically that it is non-zero? Logical knowledge is 
precisely the kind of exact knowledge to which margin for error principles should not apply. 
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As a consequence, the only plausible construal of the principle (KME) seems to be one in 
which the embedded operator refers to a form of approximate knowledge. Let us suppose it is 
perceptual knowledge. The principle then reads: 
 
K(Kπ ¬pi → ¬pi+1) 
 
What is the status of the outermost knowledge operator then? We argued it is not perceptual 
knowledge, but we think it is a form of reflective knowledge, namely non-perceptual 
knowledge about one’s own (in this case, perceptual) knowledge. The crucial fact is that 
reflective knowledge is not necessarily subject to a margin for error principle. Why should all 
forms of knowledge be subjected to such a constraint indeed? 
 
More generally, our claim is that the principles (KME) and (KK), which involve iterations 
of knowledge, should be rephrased in terms of two operators, which we write Kπ (for 
perceptual knowledge) and K (for non-perceptual, reflective knowledge). Restricting principle 
(C) to the operator K, we get as a logic: 
 
(KME’) K(Kπ ¬pi → ¬pi+1) 
 
(KK’) Kπ φ → KKπ φ 
 
(C’) If φ follows logically from a set of propositions Г, such that for all members ψ of Г, 
Kψ holds, infer Kφ 
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(KME’) now states that it is known non-perceptually that perceptual knowledge obeys the 
margin for error principle. (KK’) now states that if I perceive a certain fact, I know non-
perceptually that I perceive it. Principle (C’) now specifies that non-perceptual knowledge is 
closed under logical consequence. 
 
Let us see what happens when we rephrase the puzzle in bimodal terms. We then get: 
 
(1) Kπ ¬pi, hypothesis 
(2) K(Kπ ¬pi → ¬pi+1), by (KME’) 
(3) KKπ ¬pi, by (1) and (KK’) 
(4) Kπ ¬pi, Kπ ¬pi → ¬pi+1 ├ ¬pi+1, by propositional reasoning 
(5) K¬pi+1, by (2), (3), (4) and (C’) 
 
The principles now yield as a derived rule that if I perceive that the tree is not i inches tall, 
then I know, non-perceptually, that it is not i+1 inches tall. This now seems a safe rule, for if 
we assume that Kπ ¬p0 holds, we can only infer K¬p1, without propagating this knowledge to 
further values. In addition, it is safe in the sense that it is no more puzzling than principle 
(ME) for perceptual knowledge (remember that the margin for error principle, in this case, 
asserts that Kπ ¬pi → ¬pi+1). 
 
The bimodal epistemic logic we have appealed to here is minimal in that we have only 
needed to assume thus far principle (KK’) (which is a weak version of (KK)), principle (C) 
for the operator K, the margin for error principle for Kπ, (ME), and that this principle is K-
known to be so (principle (KME’)). Principles like (KME’) and (KK’) allow us to spell out 
plausible interactions between the different forms of knowledge at stake. But more can 
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reasonably be assumed about the separate and joint behaviour of each of K and Kπ. For 
instance, it is reasonable to suppose that both are factive (which is axiom schema T in modal 
logic), and that their factivity is K-known. Let us consider some other appropriate principles. 
 
Note, first, that we need not dispense with principle (KK), if we think this principle now 
holds of reflective knowledge only. The reason why we described the knowledge expressed 
by K as reflective knowledge is that it expresses meta-knowledge of some kind, here 
knowledge about one’s perceptual knowledge, as axiomatized by (KME’) and (KK’). It is 
natural, however, to suppose that meta-knowledge about one’s reflective knowledge is still 
reflective knowledge. Let us define a knowledge operator as positively introspective if it 
obeys positive introspection. The adoption of (KK) would mean that the reflective knowledge 
involved in (KME’) and (KK’) is also a form of positively introspective knowledge. Again, 
this seems a natural assumption to make about K, even though there might be forms of 
reflective knowledge that are not positively introspective. 
 
If positive introspection is adopted for K, one may actually strengthen principle (C’) into 
the distribution axiom K in order to recover a full S4 logic for K. What logic the operator Kπ 
might have, on the other hand, is a more delicate issue that would call for a separate 
treatment. The central point for our argument, however, is the existence of clear cases where 
meta-knowledge about one’s perceptual knowledge cannot be of the perceptual kind. An 
iterative axiom like (KME), we argued, cannot meaningfully hold of Kπ.ii The argument can 
be rephrased in a simpler way if, instead of the margin for error principle, we consider the 
factivity principle. Remember that factivity can be seen as a particular case of the margin for 
error principle. Likewise, the knowledge that one’s knowledge is factive is analogous to the 
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knowledge that one’s knowledge is subject to the margin for error principle. Consider an 
axiom like (KF), which expresses knowledge that knowledge is factive: 
 
 (KF) K(Kφ → φ) 
 
An iterative axiom of this kind cannot hold of the operator Kπ, for Kπ (Kπφ → φ) would state 
that I know perceptually that my perceptual knowledge is factive. Yet how could this piece of 
knowledge be of a perceptual kind? More generally, one may doubt the existence of pure 
iterative axioms for Kπ.iii Just as it is natural to assume that reflective knowledge is also 
positively introspective because it is essentially a form of iterative knowledge, it is natural to 
suppose that perceptual knowledge will not be positively introspective if it is not iterative in 
the first place. If we reject positive introspection for Kπ in favour of an axiom like (KK’), it is 
therefore on conceptual grounds that are very distinct from Williamson’s criticism of the 
luminosity of knowledge. 
 
One may wonder here whether the introduction of distinct knowledge operators, to account 
for distinct forms or methods of knowledge, does not put into question the notion of the unity 
of knowledge. We think it need not be so, so long as we can account for the way these 
methods interact with each other. This is essentially what axioms like (KME’) and (KK’) 
perform in our analysis of Williamson’s puzzle. But further interaction axioms can be added. 
In particular, just as (KME’) is a bimodal analogue of (KME), there should be a bimodal 
analogue (KF’) of (KF), to express the reflective knowledge that one’s perceptual knowledge 
is factive: 
 
(KF’) K(Kπ φ → φ) 
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Assuming (KK’) and (C’), (KF’) allows one to infer Kφ from the assumption Kπ φ. The 
derivation corresponds exactly to the above proof that K¬pi+1 follows from Kπ ¬pi, assuming 
(KK’), (C’) and (KME’). Again this is no surprise, given the analogy between factivity and 
the margin for error principle. If Kripke’s axiom K is assumed for K instead of (C’), one can 
easily prove the stronger result that Kπ φ → Kφ, using (KK’) and (KF’). In either case, this 
means that perceptual knowledge can be turned into reflective knowledge. There should be no 
misunderstanding here about the fact that we characterized reflective knowledge as a form of 
non-perceptual knowledge. Kπ φ → Kφ should be understood as meaning that knowledge 
acquired by perceptual means enters as an input to knowledge of a different kind. The only 
axiom and rule that we want to avoid in our system are the converse Kφ → Kπ φ  and 
Kφ ∴ Kπ φ.iv 
 
At this point, it may be useful to give a more precise characterization of the criteria we 
consider relevant in order to distinguish between perceptual and reflective knowledge. The 
first thing to say is that we conceive of both kinds of knowledge as propositional: a subject 
like Magoo can know visually, for instance, that the tree in front of him is taller than 2 inches. 
To say that he knows this fact perceptually, however, is to say that this piece of knowledge is 
given more or less directly through his visual input, without involving routines other than 
those that are usually at stake in the ordinary perception of distances and relations between 
objects. For instance, in a given situation, Magoo may be able to see that a given object a is 
taller than another object c, in which case we will say that he knows perceptually that a is 
taller than c. However, suppose a situation in which Magoo can see that a is taller than b 
through a certain window, and that he can see through a different window that b is taller than 
c. Let us suppose, moreover, that Magoo cannot see a and c together. From his memory and 
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reasoning capacities, Magoo can nevertheless infer and thereby come to know that a is taller 
than c. In that case, we would not describe the proposition in question as a proposition that 
Magoo knows perceptually, even though he knows the proposition on the basis of his visual 
perception. The reason is that Magoo’s knowledge is not acquired directly through vision, but 
rather inferred indirectly from what he sees.v In our framework, the situation can be 
represented by assuming the following two premises to hold, namely Kπ (a > b) and Kπ (b > c). 
Just from those two premises, however, it does not follow that Kπ (a > c), since we made no 
assumption regarding the closure of Kπ under logical consequence;vi however, from the 
derived rule Kπ φ → Kφ, it does follow that K(a > b) and K(b > c), and from (C’) (which we 
may suppose to apply to logical consequences based on logical postulates for the relation 
“>”), it follows in turn that K(a > c). What the example suggests, therefore, is that we do not 
need to introduce a mixed category between perceptual knowledge and reflective knowledge 
to account for knowledge based on reasoning from perceptual knowledge. Such a mixed form 
of knowledge is undeniably needed, but it is already taken care of by the operator K, assuming 
axioms (KME’), (KK’), (C’) and (KF’) as background theory. 
A second point to note is that the variety of knowledge we call reflective knowledge may 
very well stand to any more specific kind of knowledge as it stands to what we call perceptual 
knowledge in the case under discussion. Suppose for instance that Magoo comes to know by 
testimony that the Pope just died. To circumvent any objection, we may suppose that this 
information is true, that Magoo will not accept testimonies that are not perfectly reliable, and 
even that Magoo so far has been infallible in his acceptance and rejection of testimonies. So 
Magoo knows by testimony that the Pope died. But suppose moreover that Magoo is aware 
that he knows this information by testimony. Certainly, however, his knowledge that he 
knows by testimony that the Pope died does not itself count as knowledge by testimony: in 
normal circumstances, this kind of second-order knowledge is given to him directly by 
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reflection.vii More generally, therefore, for any specific kind of knowledge, be it knowledge 
by memory, testimony, a priori reasoning, reflection, and so on, if we represent by K? the kind 
of knowledge in question (where the index “?” is dummy for any proper index specifying the 
relevant kind of knowledge), what we claim is that the operator K of reflective knowledge can 
stand to K? as it does to Kπ. In particular, we may suppose that the axioms (KK’) and (KF’) 
hold not only for K vis a vis Kπ, but also vis a vis any specific operator K?. As we saw above, 
it is reasonable to suppose that one can have reflective knowledge about one’s reflective 
knowledge, which is why K can be taken to be positively introspective. But if this is so, and if 
for any indexed operator K? it therefore holds in the same way that K?p → Kp, this means that 
anything that is known through a specific method can also be known reflectively. Thus, what 
we call reflective knowledge can also be conceived as a generic kind of knowledge, allowing 
for sources in all of perception, testimony, and so on. Such a generic kind is needed in any 
case, in order to maintain an integrated account of knowledge and its different sources. 
To summarize what we have said so far: the notion of reflective knowledge encoded by the 
operator K is more general than that encoded by the operator Kπ in three respects. First, unlike 
Kπ, the operator K can embed any other knowledge operator, including itself. Secondly, any 
proposition that is known by perception can be known by reflection, although the converse 
does not hold. Finally, this entailment may hold more generally for any specific kind of 
knowledge, suggesting that reflective knowledge can be conceived as that kind of knowledge 
that is entailed by any other kind of knowledge. Precisely because of that, however, there is 
no reason to suppose that the restrictions that apply to specific kinds of knowledge will apply 
to the reflective-generic kind represented by K. We shall return to this point in section 6, and 
postpone until there the objections that might be raised against the distinction introduced in 
this section. Before that, we propose to examine how the thesis of modularity which we 
defend here bears on the validity of margin for error principles. 
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4. The Glimpse 
 
In chapter 6 of Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson presents a “perceptual” counterpart to 
the Surprise Examination Paradox, “the Glimpse”, which is structurally analogous to the 
puzzle stated in section 2 above. He concludes, for the same reasons, that principle (KK) is 
the problematic assumption at the heart of the paradox. The Glimpse is presented by 
Williamson in the following manner (2000: 135): 
 
A teacher’s pupils know that she rings all and only examination dates on the calendar in her 
office. At the beginning of the term, the only knowledge they have of examination dates 
this term comes from a distant glimpse of the calendar, enough to see that only one date is 
ringed and that it is not very near the end of the term, but not enough to narrow it down 
much more than that. The pupils recognize their situation. They know now that for all 
numbers i, if the examination is i+1 days from the end of term then they do not know that it 
will not be i days from the end (0 ≤ i < n). In particular, they know now that if it is on the 
penultimate day then they do not know now that it will be on the last day. But they also 
know from their glimpse of the calendar that it will not be on the last day. They deduce that 
it will not be on the penultimate day. They also know that if it is on the antepenultimate day 
then they do not know that it is not on the antepenultimate day. And so on. They rule out 
every day of term as a possible date for the examination. 
 
The structural analogy with the puzzle stated in section 2 should be clear. Let pi now stand 
for: “the examination is i days from the end of the term”, or equivalently here: “the date 
ringed on the calendar is i positions from the end-of-term date on the calendar”. Let Kφ 
represent the statement that the pupils know that φ (by whatever method). The assumptions 
made by Williamson are: 
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K¬p0 
K(pi+1 → ¬K¬pi), for all i  < n (KME) 
 
Exactly as in section 2, this entails K¬p1 under the assumptions (KK) and (C), and by 
repeated application of this inference pattern, this yields K¬pn for every relevant number n. 
 
The argument of Williamson against the principle (KK) can be challenged exactly as 
previously, by distinguishing between different methods of knowledge. We can still accept 
the validity of a margin for error principle (ME) in the case of knowledge acquired by 
glimpsing, as Williamson does. But a bimodal formulation of its epistemic version (KME), in 
the form of a principle like (KME’), seems more adequate, because knowledge by glimpsing 
is not the only form of knowledge at stake here. Supplementing (KME’) with principles (KK’) 
and (C’) as above, we will infer from the fact that the pupils know from their visual 
experience that the exam does not occur on the last day, that they know reflectively that it 
does not occur on the penultimate day either, even though they are unable to ascertain 
visually that there is no ring on the corresponding date. Altogether, the pupils know from 
their glimpse that the exam will not take place on the last day, and they know from a certain 
reflection on their visual abilities that it cannot take place on the penultimate day either. But it 
does not rule out the possibility that the exam takes place on the antepultimate day, indeed 
they cannot know this just from their glimpsing. Note that there is a difference with the 
Surprise Examination Paradox here. In the Surprise Paradox, the examination is announced to 
be a surprise, and it is this fact which sustains the backwards induction to the conclusion that 
there cannot be such an examination. In the Glimpse, the pupils know (from their glimpse) 
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that there will be an exam. But it is not annouced to be a surprise; they are simply unable to 
locate its occurrence precisely on the calendar. 
 
5. Non-perceptual knowledge without a margin for error 
 
Williamson’s argument against (KK) trades on a margin for error principle which he applies 
univocally to at least two different forms of knowledge, namely perceptual knowledge and 
non-perceptual, reflective knowledge. In contrast, we think that margin for error principles are 
relative to specific discriminative capacities, such as perception. It is implausible to claim that 
knowledge always involves discriminative capacities of the same kind.viii There might be 
forms of non-perceptual knowledge which do not bring about the kinds of margin for error 
brought about by perceptual knowledge. 
 
As an example of reflective transitions which clearly do not introduce additional margins 
for error, let us consider so-called “ascent routines”. In Gordon (1995)’s terminology, an 
ascent routine is a perfectly reliable method of self-ascription of beliefs. In some cases, one 
can know that one believes that it is going to rain by asking oneself whether it is going to 
rain.ix This method does not rest on a form of inner perception of one’s beliefs. Typically, it is 
world-directed rather than self-directed. In this sense, it is not an introspective method, even 
though it yields correct self-ascriptions of belief. 
Ascent routines can also ground self-ascriptions of visual experience. For instance, the 
move from one’s visual experience that it is going to rain to the judgment “I seem to see that 
it is going to rain” is perfectly reliable. Whenever one has the visual experience that p, one is 
ipso facto in a position to judge that one has such an experience. Moreover, it is plausible that 
such a routine enables the subject to gain knowledge of the fact that she has the visual 
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experience that p. Ascent routines are, at least in some cases, methods of non-perceptual self-
knowledge. 
 
Now, the use of an ascent routine need not bring about a margin for error. In the case of 
vision, the margin for error principle requests that cases sufficiently similar to cases in which 
I visually know that p be cases in which p is true.x Visual knowledge is a discriminative 
capacity which plausibly introduces a specific margin for error. However, self-knowledge 
based on an ascent routine need not introduce an additional margin for error. There does not 
seem to be a requirement that cases sufficiently similar to cases in which I know that I have 
the visual experience that p are cases in which I have the visual experience that p. The 
relevant ascent routine (from one’s experience that p to the corresponding judgment) is 
perfectly reliable precisely because it is not based on the exercise of a fallible capacity such as 
introspection as traditionally conceived. 
 
An adequate discussion of the epistemology of ascent routines is beyond the scope of this 
paper. At least two issues should be discussed further. First, in the foregoing example, the 
ascent routine works only if the subject is able to separate what is visually given from any 
extraneous (conceptual) information (see again Evans 1982). In the case of the Müller-Lyer 
illusion, one can know that one has the visual experience as of two unequal lines even if one 
also knows that the lines are in fact equal. The latter piece of knowledge is extraneous to the 
content of one’s visual experience, which is relatively modular. (We’ll return to the 
modularity of perception in the next section.) Second, ascent routines are available only from 
the content of experience as it is apprehended by the perceiver. Thus, the ascent routine from 
seeing (what is in fact) an armadillo to judging “I seem to see an armadillo” is perfectly 
reliable, but cannot be used by the perceiver if she does not know what an armadillo is, or 
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does not know what one looks like. By contrast, if she sees something as an armadillo, she 
can move directly from her first-order experience to the higher-order judgment that she has a 
visual experience as of an armadillo without bringing about an additional margin for error.xi  
 
It is important to note, though, that our argument does not hang on the existence of forms 
of knowledge which do not bring about a margin for error. It is enough for us to show that 
perceptual knowledge and non-perceptual knowledge do not introduce the same kind of 
margins for error. Once again, if Mr Magoo knows that the tree is not i inches tall by visual 
means, then he can reason to the conclusion that it is not i+1 inches tall. This reflective piece 
of knowledge may or may not bring about a margin for error additional to the margin for error 
brought about by Mr Magoo’s perceptual knowledge. Suppose for the sake of argument that it 
does. Then cases sufficiently similar to cases in which Mr Magoo knows by reasoning that the 
tree is not i+1 inches tall are cases in which the tree is not i+1 inches tall. However, the 
standard of similarity involved here is specific to the reflective method of knowledge used by 
Mr Magoo. In particular, the case in which the tree is not i+2 inches tall may no longer be 
relevantly similar to the cases in which Mr Magoo uses this method. Williamson’s puzzle still 
does not arise: Mr Magoo may not be able to reason to the conclusion that the tree is not i+3 
inches tall from his initial perceptual knowledge that it is not i inches tall. 
 
To our minds, margin for error principles are best conceived as relative to methods or forms 
of knowledge, namely those that involve some specific discriminative capacity. From the 
premise that Mr Magoo visually knows that the tree is not i inches tall, one may indeed 
conclude that he knows through reasoning that the tree is not i+1 inches tall (which he may 
also know visually, of course). Now suppose that there is a precise point n at which Mr 
Magoo does not visually know that the tree is not n inches tall but does visually know that it 
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is not n-1 inches tall. On our account, it entails that Mr Magoo can still know through 
reasoning that the tree is not n inches tall. There is no paradox here: the fact that a truth is not 
known visually is compatible with the fact that it is known by other, non-perceptual means. 
The margin for error brought about by visual perception need not concern knowledge gained 
by reasoning, and thus one can solve Williamson’s puzzle without necessarily impairing the 
validity of the (KK) principle.xii 
 
6. Reply to some objections 
 
In the previous sections we have argued that Williamson’s attack against the principle of 
positive introspection rests on an equivocation between two types of knowledge, namely a 
reflective type of knowledge, susceptible of iterations, but not necessarily involving a margin 
for error, and a perceptual type of knowledge, involving a margin for error, but most likely 
not susceptible of iterations. In this final section of the paper, we turn to the discussion of 
several objections that may be raised against the present account. 
 
1.  First, note that what we are claiming is not that Williamson fails to acknowledge that 
there are different sources and types of knowledge in general. The idea that knowledge comes 
in different varieties is fairly uncontroversial, and this is certainly not a view that Williamson 
would deny. Rather, the core of our argument is that Williamson fails to take into account a 
dimension of modularity of knowledge in the scenario he is describing: the knowledge I have 
about my visual knowledge need not be constrained in the way in which my visual knowledge 
is constrained. Nevertheless, Williamson may still resist our criticism, by pointing out that the 
limitations inherent to the subject’s perceptual knowledge are inherited by higher-order levels 
of knowledge. Thus, in his statement of the puzzle, Williamson considers that “Mr Magoo’s 
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deductive capacities do not fully enable him to overcome the limitations of his eyesight and 
ability to judge heights” (2000: 116). In particular, the bimodal reformulation of the principles 
we suggested above should preclude a situation in which Magoo is unable to ascertain 
visually that the tree is not i inches and yet is able to know deductively (from his visual 
information) that the tree is not i inches. In other words, Williamson may insist that the 
conjunction K¬pi & ¬Kπ ¬pi is inconsistent – namely, that if it is known reflectively that the 
tree is not i inches tall, it is also known visually. This would block our solution to the puzzle. 
But why should this entailment hold in general, other than by a petitio principii? Consider 
again the case of the Müller-Lyer illusion, in which two lines are seen as unequal, while they 
are in fact equal. This is a situation in which our reflective knowledge that the two lines are of 
equal size is not backed up by our initial visual perception. The case of visual illusions is 
probably the best kind of example we can think of in favour of the modularity we claim is 
relevant in Williamson’s puzzle. More generally, we certainly agree with Williamson that 
Magoo’s reflective capacities do not “fully enable him to overcome the limitations of his 
eyesight and ability to judge heights”, but simply from this it does not follow that Magoo’s 
reflective capacities should be subject to exactly the same limitations that affect his visual 
abilities and the spontaneous judgments that depend on those capacities. A further argument is 
in any case required to support the idea that higher-order knowledge and first-order 
knowledge obey the same margins of error. 
 
2. A more specific criticism that may nevertheless be raised against our proposal concerns 
the prediction made in our system that if Magoo knows visually that the tree is not n inches 
tall, then he can know reflectively that it is not n+1 inches tall. The objection comes in two 
stages: to begin with, one may accept our claim of modularity, and nevertheless reject the idea 
that by combining reflection and perception, one can come to know more than by perception 
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alone. In particular, if Magoo cannot tell by perception that the tree is not n+1 inches tall, 
how can he tell it by reflection plus perception? Wouldn’t Magoo need some further empirical 
input? Our answer to this question is that, from a logical point of view, there is no reason to 
suppose that if a piece of knowledge is not derivable on the basis of perception alone, it will 
not be derivable on the basis of perception plus reflection. To claim otherwise is to assume 
that the addition of reflection to perception is systematically conservative over perception. But 
it is not necessarily so: as we saw earlier, I can see that an object a is taller than an object b, 
see that b is in turn taller than a third object c, and infer upon reflection that a is taller than c, 
without being able to ascertain the fact visually. The situation is similar in the case of the 
Müller-Lyer illusion which we mentioned above. 
Still, and this is the second part of the objection, our system may yield too strong 
predictions in some cases. An example to that effect was given by J. Snyder (p.c.). Snyder 
imagined a situation in which Magoo knows perceptually that the tree is 1009, 1010, or 1011 
inches tall, something we can symbolize as Kπ (p1009 ∨ p1010 ∨ p1011), but cannot tell by 
perception which of those three heights it is. However, he supposes that Magoo can see that 
the tree is not 1008 inches tall, and also that it is not 1012 inches tall, namely Kπ ¬p1008 and 
Kπ ¬p1012. Assuming the version of the rule obtained in our system that would result from a 
downward version of the margin of error principle, namely Kπ ¬pi+1∴K¬pi, it follows from 
the last two assumptions that K¬p1009 and K¬p1011, and by (KF’) and (C’), it follows from 
Kπ (p1009 ∨ p1010 ∨ p1011) that Kp1010: I therefore come to know reflectively that the tree is 1010 
inches tall, although by assumption I do not know this perceptually. Here Snyder asks: 
“Where did the extra information come from? If your perceptual system was not good enough 
to distinguish between p1009, p1010, and p1011, and if the information you had about the tree 
came from your perceptual system, then how did you end up knowing p1010, perceptually or 
not? The problem seems to be your analog of Williamson’s derived rule”.  
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We agree with Snyder that the prediction may be too strong in this particular case, granting 
the plausibility of the premises. To begin with, we have granted Mr Magoo a piece of 
disjunctive knowledge of the form Kπ (p1009 ∨ p1010 ∨ p1011), but more realistically, he will be 
able to see that the tree’s height is anywhere on a continuum from 1009 to 1011 inches. So 
even if Mr Magoo can exclude that the tree is either 1009 or 1011 inches tall, he will be left 
with a host of remaining options and his knowledge of the tree will not be exact. 
Another point is that our derived rule depends on principle (KME’) in the first place, 
namely the analog of Williamson’s (KME). It is important to bear in mind that we assumed 
(KME’) for the sake of the argument, namely to show that, even if such a rule is assumed, no 
pernicious sorites need follow. That being said, we think the real question behind the 
objection concerns in fact the origin of such a principle, namely how the subject comes to 
know the margin of error of his perceptual knowledge (an assumption we have no reason to 
deny to rational subjects). In our discussion of Williamson’s scenario, we assumed that the 
subject could reflect on his perceptual abilities, but following Williamson, we did not give an 
account of the origin of this knowledge. Several answers to the question “Where did the extra 
information come from?” are conceivable, however. We could imagine that the subject’s 
reflective knowledge of his perceptual limitations is acquired empirically, or even given by 
some oracle. If so, it is conceivable that the subject comes to know some information that he 
cannot ascertain simply on the basis of his perception. The prediction, once again, is not by 
itself implausible: let us think again of the reasoning made by the pupils in the case of the 
Glimpse. If the pupils are certain that the date ringed was not the last one, and if they can 
infer, on the basis of their past experience or from what they take to be a regularity of their 
perceptual apparatus, that this implies the ring could not be on the penultimate day either, then 
they come to know this fact reflectively, even as the visual stimulus is no longer there to 
confirm this piece of reflective knowledge. Thus, although the variety of knowledge we call 
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reflective is tied to some notion of immediate or spontaneous awareness through an axiom 
like (KK’) in particular, we consider possible that an axiom like (KME’) expresses a form of 
self-knowledge acquired empirically, more than by inner sense.xiii If such is the case, this will 
undeniably give support to the idea that the kind of reflective knowledge in question is also 
inexact and subject to a margin for error. But the point remains that this margin need not be of 
the same kind as the margin affecting perceptual knowledge. 
 
3. A third and more radical objection is the following. We said in section 3 that the variety 
of knowledge we call reflective is also generic, in the sense that it can embed any other kind 
of knowledge, and be such that it is entailed by any other kind of knowledge. Moreover, we 
have admitted that such a general kind of knowledge is needed, allowing for sources in all of 
perception, a priori reasoning and so on. But then, as was pointed out to us, maybe 
Williamson would argue that the principles he is discussing apply to this general kind of 
knowledge. More explicitly, the objection may be put as follows: if it holds that any 
proposition that is known perceptually is also known reflectively, and if reflective knowledge 
is furthermore entailed by any specific kind of knowledge, then why not rephrase the puzzle 
directly with respect to that general kind of knowledge? Our answer is that this move would 
not be licit, however, on pain of committing a logical fallacy. To take an analogy first, 
suppose someone were to draw a general conclusion about mammals from some feature that 
is specific to dogs only: we would object by saying that “mammal” has been unduly 
substituted for “dog” somewhere, even though we agree that every dog is a mammal. The 
situation is analogous here: from the fact that Kπ entails K (namely from the schema 
Kπφ → Kφ which we accept), it does not follow that one can substitute the operator K to Kπ 
everywhere, for this would mean that any property that holds only of perceptual knowledge 
also holds of the notion encoded by K, something which is not the case. Our point is precisely 
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that there are no reasons to think that margin for error principles apply to any kind of 
knowledge in the same way that they apply to perceptual knowledge. Likewise, we argued 
that perceptual knowledge can fail to be iterative, but we would not want to ascribe this 
failure to other kinds of knowledge, and therefore not to the kind of reflective knowledge 
described by the operator K. In footnote iv, we gave a model-theoretic illustration of this 
point: while the validity of Kπφ → Kφ in Kripke frames means that any proposition that is 
known perceptually is known reflectively, it also implies, conversely, that the accessibility 
relation underlying K is included in the one underlying Kπ, and therefore that the operator Kπ 
can very well fail to be positively introspective, without K failing to be so. Consequently, to 
insist in this way that Williamson’s argument be phrased using only one operator would be to 
beg the question.  
 
4. Despite this, how should we respond to someone who would insist that the notion of 
knowledge involved in Williamson’s argument is the generic notion of knowledge? Isn’t our 
criticism of Williamson’s argument, in that case, an implicit denial of the validity of the 
unrestricted margin for error principle? Our answer is that this unrestricted principle would 
indeed be implausibly strong, even in the particular scenarios discussed by Williamson. To 
make the point vivid, let us go back to the example of the Glimpse, and see more carefully 
how the pupils might reasonably elaborate on their knowledge that the date ringed on the 
calendar is not the last one. To make things concrete, consider a particular pupil – let us call 
her Marge – who glimpsed the calendar. All Marge can remember and therefore know 
initially is that the date ringed was not on the last day of the calendar. Suppose there are 90 
days on the calendar. What Marge knows is that the date ringed is not on day 90. In order to 
represent the notion of knowledge as generic, we will symbolize this as K¬p90, no longer 
subscripting the knowledge operator in a way that represents specific types of knowledge. 
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Now, Marge wonders if the date ringed could have been on day 89. But Marge knows that if 
that were the case, she would not have been able to see that the ring was not on day 90, 
because the two dates are too close on the calendar for her to discriminate. Thus, Marge can 
safely infer that the day ringed is not day 89, that is K¬p89. Now, suppose moreover, that the 
date actually ringed on the calendar is day 88, that is the exam is to take place on the 
antepenultimate day of the term. Can Marge here infer in the same way that the date ringed 
cannot be on day 88? We see no reason to suppose so; more than that, this situation is likely 
to provide a counterexample to the unrestricted margin of error principle. Indeed, if Marge 
had seen that the date ringed was not 89, in the same way in which she remembers that the 
date ringed is not 90, then she would be able to infer that the date is not 88. However, by 
hypothesis, the fact that the date ringed on the calendar is not on 89 is not her initial input. 
Moreover, day 88 is in principle distant enough from day 90 for Marge to discriminate 
between them. If so, and if Marge is able to infer that the date ringed is not on day 89, while it 
is actually on day 88, then this suggests that the margin for error principle K¬pi → ¬pi-1 does 
not hold in full generality. On our view, this example makes plausible that there is a particular 
number i-1 such that the date is in fact exactly i-1, but that Marge knows that the date is not i.  
The same can be said about the scenario involving Mr Magoo. The difference with the 
Glimpse is that, unlike Marge, Mr Magoo has a sustained visual experience of the tree, and 
can thereby acquire several pieces of knowledge of the form “The tree is not n inches tall” 
(i.e. K¬pn). This difference is not substantial, however, for once again, there will be a point at 
which Mr Magoo can see and safely estimate that the tree is not i inches tall, but cannot see in 
the same way that the tree is not i+1 inches tall, perhaps because the tree is in fact i+2 inches 
tall. Let us suppose that i = 1000, and that the tree is 1002 inches tall. On the basis of his 
visual experience of the tree, Mr Magoo knows that ¬p1000. At this point, we can assume that 
there is a valid application of the unrestricted margin for error principle, namely: 
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 K¬p1000 → ¬p1001 
 
This application is valid because the possibility that p1001 is relevant to whether Mr Magoo 
possesses knowledge that ¬p1000. For suppose that p1001 were the case. Then Mr Magoo might 
easily have been mistaken in forming the perceptual judgment that ¬p1000, given that he 
cannot discriminate between a situation in which p1000 and a situation in which p1001. 
Mr Magoo, being a reflective thinker, knows that ¬p1001. Now, is this further application of 
the unrestricted margin for principle also valid? 
 
K¬p1001 → ¬p1002 
 
It should be obvious that it is not so. For the possibility that p1002 is now irrelevant to 
whether Mr Magoo possesses knowledge that ¬p1001 (it would be relevant if Magoo had been 
in a position to see at the beginning that the tree was not p1001, but remember that it cannot be 
the case). Even if p1002 is the case, Mr Magoo remains in a position to know that ¬p1001 on the 
basis of his inference from his visual knowledge that ¬p1000. The fact that p1002 is no threat to 
his actual knowledge that ¬p1001, in contrast to the previous situation, where the possibility 
that p1001 was a threat to Mr Magoo’s actual knowledge that ¬p1000. 
By leaving underspecified the notion of knowledge in these two scenarios, we therefore 
conclude that the margin for error principle does not hold in full generality. It does not follow, 
however, that we should entirely forsake it: the point of the previous sections was that if this 
principle is properly restricted (by distinguishing the methods of knowledge relevant to its 
applications), then one can do better justice to its initial plausibility. 
 
Margin for Error and the Transparency of Knowledge 
 30
5. The fallacy we pointed out in 3 above invites us to dispel another potential 
misunderstanding. The misunderstanding concerns the scope of the (KK) principle. One may 
be tempted to think that if reflective knowledge is generic in the sense of being entailed by 
any specific kind of knowledge, and if it obeys positive introspection, then any specific kind 
of knowledge should satisfy the (KK) principle too, including perceptual knowledge. We 
explained, however, in what sense this reasoning is flawed. The reason why it is tempting to 
make this inference, however, is that if any kind of knowledge is positively introspective, then 
it should follow by universal instantiation that perceptual knowledge too is positively 
introspective. Since in our system K obeys positive introspection, while Kπ does not, this 
implies that the operator K cannot be taken to mean “any kind of knowledge” in this rather 
loose sense. In this respect, it is important to realize that we agree with Williamson on the 
following general consequence of his argument, namely the fact that the (KK) principle does 
not hold unrestrictedly. In Williamson’s account, however, what this means is that knowledge 
fails to be introspective tout court. In our account, by contrast, what this means is rather that 
some varieties of knowledge may simply fail to be iterative. The point, however, is that the 
kind of knowledge encoded by the K operator in our system, namely reflective knowledge, 
can very well be positively introspective and be such that it is entailed by any other kind of 
knowledge. This makes an important conceptual difference, since the lesson Williamson 
draws from the incompatibility of positive introspection with margin for error principles is 
that “we have no cognitive home” (2000, chap. 4). While our aim is not to maintain the 
universal validity of positive introspection, we may still consistenly hold that reflective 
knowledge remains one of those cognitive homes. 
 
6. Another objection to our argument concerns the idea that perceptual knowledge is not 
susceptible of iterations, and more generally the criteria that we use to distinguish between so-
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called perceptual and non-perceptual knowledge. In the treatment presented above, we 
insisted indeed that the kind of meta-knowledge one has about one’s visual knowledge is not 
itself visual. But this kind of limitation may seem too strong. Josh Snyder (p.c.) came up with 
the following counterexample: “At the eye-doctor, examining the eye-charts, I discover that I 
cannot read the letters below a certain size. This certainty seems to be perceptual knowledge 
of the limitations of my perceptual capabilities”. To make the example concrete, consider a 
situation in which I see a letter of which I cannot tell whether it is a D or an O (although I am 
fairly confident it has to be one of them). The situation therefore seems to support the 
following margin for error principle: D → ¬Kπ ¬O, namely if it is a D, I do not exclude 
visually that it is an O, but also the iterative version: Kπ (D → ¬Kπ ¬O), namely I know 
visually that if it is a D, then I might be seeing an O. Our answer, however, is that one ought 
to distinguish more carefully between the content of one’s visual experience and the content 
of one’s judgement. I first see a letter of which I am uncertain whether it is a D or an O. I then 
make the judgement that if it is a D, I might be seeing an O. Although that judgement about 
my visual capabilities is acquired on the basis of my visual experience, it is not an item of 
visual experience properly speaking. For that same reason, we think the logical form of the 
reflective version of the margin for error principle should be: K(D → ¬Kπ ¬O). But once 
again, what we call reflective knowledge should be thought of as a generic kind of 
knowledge, not necessarily subject to the same constraints which bear upon more specific 
forms of knowledge which serve as input to it. 
 
7. The last objection we want to consider concerns theoretical economy. Although one may 
feel inclined toward the kind of modular treatment of knowledge that we are advocating here, 
one may find the introduction of two distinct knowledge operators too costly. This move may 
seem somewhat ad hoc, and it threatens the epistemic vocabulary with endless multiplication. 
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If two operators are allowed, why not carry on with three, and so on, in order to make even 
finer distinctions (for example between varieties of perceptual knowledge)? Wouldn’t it be 
more elegant to maintain a single knowledge operator, and incorporate modularity at the 
semantic level rather than the syntactic level? A modular semantics of this kind is 
conceivable, however, and was actually developed in a sequel to this paper by Bonnay & Egré 
(2006): instead of using two distinct knowledge operators and putting syntactic restrictions on 
their iterative behavior and interaction, as we did here, the authors state satisfaction clauses 
that lead to a differentiated treatment of iterated and non-iterated modalities for an epistemic 
logic with only one epistemic operator. The conceptual motivation remains essentially the 
same, however. Here we focussed on the original formulation of Williamson’s puzzle, and 
showed in what way a minimal modification of Williamson’s own syntactic assumptions in 
terms of two knowledge modalities is both more plausible and prevents the paradox. But one 
may equally well start with a semantic version of Williamson’s paradox, adopting the kind of 
margin for error semantics presented in the appendix to Williamson (1994), and give a 
“modular” version that validates the principle of positive introspection. Either way, the lesson 
of Williamson’s puzzle is not necessarily that we should get rid of the introspection 
principles, but rather that more modularity is needed in the way we conceptualize knowledge. 
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i Williamson’s first formulation of the margin for error principle appears in Williamson (1990: 104-106). His 
criticism of the (KK) principle originally appears in Williamson (1992). The argument is also presented in 
chapter 8 of Williamson (1994). 
ii Following Lewis (1974), we call iterative a formula in which “intensional operators occur within the scope of 
intensional operators”. 
iii We say that an iterative formula is pure if it involves only one kind of operator. Axiom (KF) is iterative and 
pure in this sense, whereas (KF’), although iterative, is not pure, since it involves two distinct modalities. 
iv Let’s call KK’ the bimodal system with two modalities K and Kπ, closed under the two rules of generalization 
φ∴Kφ and φ∴Kπ φ, and such that: K satisfies the schemata 4, T and K; Kπ satisfies the schemata T and K; axiom 
(KK’) holds: Kπφ → KKπ φ. The schemata K(Kπ φ → φ) and Kπ φ → Kφ are theorems in KK’. The converse 
Kφ → Kπ φ  is not a theorem of KK’, however, for KK’, with its usual Kripke semantics, is sound with respect to 
the class of frames (W, R, Rπ ) in which R is reflexive and transitive, Rπ is reflexive, and ∀xyz(xRy & yRπ z → 
xRπ z); it is easy to define a two-world model satisfying this condition in which Kφ → Kπ φ  is not valid (the same 
result holds if one assumes K and Kπ are both S5 modalities). Note that R ⊆ Rπ in such frames. KK’ is already 
too strong a system for our purposes, however, since it also proves Kπ(Kφ → φ), by generalization, which would 
mean that I can perceive that my general knowledge is factive, something we want to avoid. What matters here, 
however, is that even in such a strong system there is no collapse between the modalities K and Kπ. 
v We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this example. 
vi We could make that assumption without affecting our argument, however. Such an assumption is for instance 
present in Bonnay & Égré’s (2006) epistemic semantics, in which only one epistemic operator is used, but such 
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that margins of error can be confined to first-order knowledge. Their approach makes clearer the fact that if I 
know visually that p, for instance, assuming this knowledge is constrained by a margin of error, and if q follows 
from p, then my first-order knowledge that q obeys the same margin of error, be it purely inferential or a mix of 
vision and inference. The important point, however, here as in their account, is that my knowing that I know is 
not necessarily subject to this margin of error. 
vii We do not thereby claim that any specific form of knowledge fails to be iterative as we claim of perceptual 
knowledge. For instance, although “I know by testimony that I know by testimony that p” sounds odd (if we 
understand this as de se knowledge), we can perfectly imagine adverbial modifications other than “reflectively”, 
like “I know a priori that I know a priori that p”, for which the iterations make sense. It remains possible to 
interpret “I know by testimony that I know by testimony that p”, however, if the subject means that she cannot 
recall that it is by testimony that she came to know p, although someone reminded her that her knowledge that p 
comes from a specific testimony.  If so, this means there is an interesting difference between knowledge by 
perception and knowledge by testimony: in the case of knowledge by perception, we claim that iterations of Kπ 
are most likely ill-formed; by contrast, if there was an operator Kτ for knowledge by testimony, iterations would 
make sense in particular cases, but this would not be sufficient to support the validity of a principle of the form 
Kτ p → Kτ Kτ p. 
viii Note that we are not saying that Williamson himself would claim that all forms of knowledge are subject to 
the margin for error principle. Even though Williamson does not discuss the matter explicitly, the quote given in 
section 1 above suggests the opposite. Our claim is only that, in his argument against the (KK) principle, 
Williamson fails to take into account that different forms of knowledge are involved. 
ix As Evans (1982: 225-6) puts it, “whenever you are in a position to assert that p, you are ipso facto in a position 
to assert ‘I believe that p’.” 
x Here, we adapt another formulation used by Williamson to define the notion of a margin for error principle: “A 
margin for error principle is a principle of the form ‘A’ is true in all cases similar to cases in which ‘It is known 
that A’ is true” (1994: 227). 
xi The armadillo example is borrowed from Dretske (1993), who argues that one can see an armadillo without 
seeing that it is an armadillo. 
xii A different line of criticism against the validity of margin for error principles has been investigated by 
M. Gomez-Torrente and D. Graff. The criticism is based on the idea that some propositions seem obviously 
known and also subject to the (KK) principle. Thus “we know that any man with zero hairs is bald” 
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(Graff 2002: 127), and all iterations of knowledge seem to hold as well. If the existence of such propositions is 
granted, and the margin for error principle is assumed to hold for all numerical values, the puzzle of Williamson 
that we examined comes up again. 
xiii A detailed discussion of the plausibility of (KME) is beyond the scope of its paper. For a precise discussion of 
the principle, see Bonnay & Egré (forthcoming), who make an explicit comparison with the present approach.  
